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We recently provided an updated the-
ory of the role of posterior ventral right
inferior frontal cortex (hereafter rIFC) in
inhibitory response control (Aron et al.,
2014). We claimed that when rIFC is trig-
gered by a stop signal, unexpected event
or endogenous rule, it engages a brake;
i.e., it slows, pauses, or completely stops
an action via one or more rIFC-based
fronto-basal-ganglia networks.
This account was challenged by two
recent papers: “Ten years of inhibition
revisited” by Swick and Chatham (2014),
and “A functional network perspective on
response inhibition and attentional con-
trol” by Erika-Florence et al. (2014). Here
we address the points made in those
papers.
Swick and Chatham (hereafter S&C)
argue that rIFC instead monitors for cues
that signal a change of action, and ques-
tion our interpretation of Chatham et al.
(2012). In that study, for the stop signal
task, subjects tried to stop when a signal
occurred; in the double Go task, when the
signal occurred, subjects continued their
response and then repeated it. Right IFC
was activated both for stop and double Go
trials. However, the signal on double Go
trials slowed the primary response, con-
sistent with infrequent events recruiting
a brake. S&C further showed that dou-
ble Go trials without primary task slowing
also activated the rIFC. But such activation
could still reflect a brake that fails to slow
the response. S&C ask: (a) Why should
braking occur on such trials when they are
contrary to task goals (to respond quickly)?
We propose, along with others (Chatham
et al., 2012; Wiecki and Frank, 2013),
that braking, at least of the externally
triggered, rather than endogenously trig-
gered variety, is inextricably linked with
salience detection—at least when salient
signals are relevant to ongoing behavior
(also see Wessel and Aron, 2014). (b) How
can we argue that the above rIFC activa-
tion reflected “braking” when it was too late
to affect behavior, when, at the same time,
it has been shown that rIFC BOLD corre-
lates with SSRT (Whelan et al., 2012)? We
see no contradiction here. Right IFC acti-
vation within a subject could be similar
for double Go trials (slowed or not) and
stop trials (successful or not)—reflecting
triggering of rIFC. On the other hand,
rIFC activation between-subjects varies for
successful stop trials, with several stud-
ies showing increased activation for faster
stop speeds (Aron and Poldrack, 2006;
Congdon et al., 2010; Whelan et al., 2012;
Cai et al., 2014). (c) Why is rIFC more
strongly recruited on double Go trials than
during the stop task itself? That compar-
ison is confounded by the double Go
condition always being performed first.
Activation decreases with practice (Kelly
and Garavan, 2005) although within-
session practice effects specifically for
response inhibition paradigms have not, to
our knowledge, been reported. (d) Why is
rIFC recruitment sustained even when sub-
jects must always produce a “go” response
and proactive inhibitory control is unneces-
sary? Activation for the contrast of double
Go vs. rest blocks covered almost the entire
right frontal lobe, making interpretation
difficult in relation to braking.
Using ECoG we showed rIFC activa-
tion even when a stop signal did not
occur (but was merely expected), and that
the time of activation was around the
response and not the anticipated time of
the stop signal (Swann et al., 2013). S&C
correctly observe that the tight timing
to the response only occurred in 2 out
of 5 patients. However, we then showed
(Wessel et al., 2013) that rIFC direct
electrical stimulation (DES) just before
the response induced slowing in a brak-
ing context. S&C argue this could arise
from non-specific effects of DES (men-
tioning that frontal DES at 60Hz induces
visual hallucinations). But note: (i) our
frontal effect occurred relative to a con-
trol site, using two brief pulses of DES
(not the 60Hz method, nor the “short
train” method of 5 pulses, with 3ms
interpulse interval, Axelson et al., 2009)
(ii) it was context-specific—slowing only
those subjects who were not already slow-
ing, (iii) it more strongly affected trials
on which braking was needed, and (iv)
DES like ours can have highly specific
effects (Desmurget et al., 2013). It could be
argued that such rIFC recruitment reflects
a kind of monitor (Chatham et al., 2012;
Chevalier et al., 2014) that activates in
proximity to the irrevocable/ballistic stage
of an action, so long as that action is
contingent on the absence of some coun-
termanding signal. However, it is unclear
how disrupting the activity of this puta-
tive monitor would elongate RT unless
response initiation has to wait until the
monitor function is complete; yet other
work has shown that responses are initi-
ated as early as 200ms after the go stimulus
(Jahfari et al., 2010). For us, the data are
most compatible with rIFC being part of a
brake.
S&C question the anatomical speci-
ficity of our ECoG studies to rIFC. While
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our supplementary data (Swann et al.,
2009) showed the successful vs. failed stop
increase most consistently within rIFC, it
did also occur in premotor cortex. Our
subsequent reports also showed the power
increase in rIFC (Swann et al., 2012;
Wessel et al., 2013) but we did not ana-
lyze all the electrodes as these studies
were hypothesis-driven. We will eventually
provide a fuller picture.
S&C say we ignored the study of
Verbruggen et al. (2010), in which TMS of
rIFC prolonged SSRT but also the making
of a second response. That study pro-
posed that rIFC updates action plans in
general: in a stop context it “brakes” the
response, and in a dual response con-
text it reprograms an alternative action.
Although reprogramming could involve
first applying a brake, if it were shown
that it is purely reprogramming then we
would accept a more general rIFC role.
However, an alternative is the likely spa-
tial spread of TMS over wider posterior
rIFC, possibly affecting both putative
“braking” in rIFC and reprogramming
in adjacent ventral premotor cortex
(Buch et al., 2010).
We now turn to the challenge by Erika-
Florence et al. (2014) (hereafter EF et al.).
This fMRI study included a stop task
and several putative non-inhibitory tasks.
From right lateral PFC and insula, 7 ROIs
were generated from independent com-
ponents analysis. Data in several ROIs
showed transient activation during the
stop task, but also for the other tasks lead-
ing to the conclusion that there is no “pre-
frontal inhibitory module.” However, we
nowhere claimed such a module. In our
first review (Aron et al., 2004) the full
sentence (“Whereas neuroimaging impli-
cates diverse PFC foci, advances in human
lesion-mapping support the functional
localization of such inhibition to right IFC
alone.”) makes clear that we were specifi-
cally claiming that rIFCwas alone amongst
prefrontal regions in implementing inhi-
bition. We also anticipated involvement
of a broader network (“Future research
should investigate . . . [rIFC] interaction
within a wider network”), which is now
well ratified. Second, the EF study was
not focused on the crucial posterior ven-
tral rIFC region. While we did confirm, in
data kindly provided by the authors, that
components 2, 4, 6, and 7 had activation
overlapping with rIFC (i.e., MNI 48 16
18 from meta-analysis, Levy and Wagner,
2011), consistent with braking in one or
more of the tasks, none of the small
5mm spherical ROIs was placed there.
EF acknowledged their study may have
focused on the “wrong set of IFC sub-
regions” but they argued “. . . several of
these ROIs were related to inhibitory task
performance as gauged by correlations
between SSRT and functional connec-
tivity measures.” But just because SSRT
correlated with some functional connec-
tivity measures between IFC subregions
and other regions does not prove that
those IFC subregions implement brak-
ing. While many hypothesis-driven studies
have found correlations between nodes or
connections of the putative braking net-
work and SSRT (probably corresponding
to the variability in SSRT that is related to
braking), SSRT also reflects other sensory
and attentional processes (Boucher et al.,
2007).
We also have concerns about EF’s “non-
inhibitory” tasks, e.g., the “respond task.”
When the occasional signals occurred,
subjects responded according to the direc-
tion of the earlier Go arrow on that trial. As
RT was fast (∼450ms) subjects were prob-
ably always preparing a movement and
keeping it in abeyance with a “hold-your-
horses” (Wiecki and Frank, 2013) or other
(Duque and Ivry, 2009) braking process
that could activate rIFC.
EF et al. made much of successful and
failed stop trials activating equally. Yet this
is long-established by well-powered fMRI
analysis (Congdon et al., 2010), proba-
bly reflecting that rIFC activation cor-
responds to incoming triggers to “turn
on” the brake, regardless of behavioral
success.
Finally, EF’s view that rIFC and its net-
works implement a “general class of atten-
tional and working memory maintenance
processes” does not provide easily testable
hypotheses and fails to specify how this
processing is converted into action.
Turning back to S&C. They raised ques-
tions about lateralization. In a substantial
sample of patients with right vs. left lat-
eral frontal lesions (Aron et al., 2003),
we showed that rIFC but not left lateral
damage affected SSRT. But Swick et al.
(2008) showed that left lateral frontal
damage increased commission errors for
a Go/NoGo task. We observed this also
occurred for the 50/50 condition where
decision-making rather than response
inhibition probably occurs. S&C replied
that NoGo ability was disproportionately
impaired in the 90/10 condition. Yet
this could have arisen because patients
respondedmore quickly on Go trials in the
90/10 than 50/50 condition, which could
exacerbate a decision-making deficit. To
be clear, the task required NoGoing to
the letter “X” and not others; this will
require, in the 90/10 condition a process
of object recognition, rule matching with
verbal working memory followed by trig-
gering of a brake; we propose that left
IFC damage could have impaired the ver-
bal WM process rather than the brake.
The speed pressure of the 90/10 condition
could add “noise” the verbal WM process,
thus exacerbating the deficit.
S&C claimed we omitted reference to
Kramer et al. (2013) which purported to
show left IFC to be critical for inhibitory
control whilst challenging the critical role
of right IFC. This lesion study comprised
a small sample of patients with left or
right frontal stroke. On a NoGo task, the
patients (both hemispheres grouped, and
not with specific damage to IFC) made
more commission errors than controls,
especially for 80/20 vs. 50/50 conditions.
This hardly shows that left IFC is critical
for inhibitory control. As above, commis-
sion errors may reflect decision-making
failure (esp. in the 50/50 Go/NoGo con-
dition). Regarding the stop task, only two
out of 9 left frontals had a deficit relative to
controls (and these left frontals had dam-
age to many regions). In the right frontals,
1 of the 5 had an SSRT deficit com-
pared to controls; and, admittedly three
patients, who did have rIFC damage, did
not. Thus, whilst right IFC damage some-
times fails to produce a deficit we note
it is difficult to interpret null results in
chronic lesion studies because of possible
re-organization.
A lesion study by Molenberghs et al.
(2009) is also relevant. Patients performed
a Sustained Attention to Response Task
(SART), responding quickly to any digit
1–9 except “3,” which required action
withholding. Failing to do so was a com-
mission error. Four out of 19 left frontals
had left IFC damage, with commission
errors similar to controls. Six out of
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25 right frontals had a lesion overlap-
ping with rIFC. Four of these had mas-
sively increased commission errors (60%
or more), but no difference in omissions
or RT compared to controls. The authors
restudied two of these patients years later.
They replicated the effect of very ele-
vated commission errors using the stan-
dard SART, and then showed no deficit
at all when the patients were required to
Go rather than NoGo to the infrequent
signals. This again suggests rIFC is criti-
cal for braking but not monitoring, which
could relate to a different sub-region, per-
haps inferior frontal junction (Levy and
Wagner, 2011). Notably a recent meta-
analysis purports to dissociate the brak-
ing function to rIFC and the stop signal
detecting attentional function to the right
insula (Cai et al., 2014).
Regarding the locus of braking to rIFC
rather than OFC, DLPFC, or left IFC, we
suggested this could be falsified by stud-
ies that selectively disrupt these regions
without damaging connections. S&C ask
how could one prove a lack of damage to
“connections” in a real frontal patient or
TMS subject? To give an example: such
a falsifying study could show that dam-
age to rDLPFC and not rIFC impaired
stopping (not merely by disrupting rule
knowledge), and moreover, using DTI
(Mah et al., 2014), that the DLPFC lesion
spared connections between rIFC and
preSMA.
Regarding the function of rIFC, we
argued it does not merely reflect moni-
toring and that “Our position could be
falsified by, for example, a disruption study
that (a) uses a task that clearly does
require braking, (b) shows that disruption
does not affect outright stopping or brak-
ing/pausing, (c) shows that disruption does
affect some other function such as atten-
tional detection or monitoring.” S&C ask
how could one prove that a task (of mon-
itoring) lacks all inhibitory demands. We
propose a test of simple oddball detection,
as above (Molenberghs et al., 2009).
Our view, sharpened by this challeng-
ing analysis of S&C and EF, is that rIFC
is turned on by signals that occur during
impending behavior (it can also perhaps
be turned on endogenously and tonically).
When rIFC is turned on, the brake is
engaged. Whether this affects behavior
depends on the timing of the signal in
relation to the impending behavior (and
fMRI of rIFC is not apparently sensitive to
whether behavior is affected). Triggering
the brake requires a monitor, but that is
possibly implemented in a different PFC
sector. Higher resolution ECoG and MEG
could be useful for understanding the rela-
tive timing of PFC subregions for different
putative functions.
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